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Abstract
Recent work has shown the possibility of adversarial attacks on automatic speech
recognition (ASR) systems. However, in the vast majority of work in this area, the
attacks have been executed only in the digital space, or have involved short phrases
and static room settings. In this paper, we demonstrate a physically realizable
audio adversarial attack. We base our approach specifically on a psychoacoustic-
property-based loss function, and automated generation of room impulse responses,
to create adversarial attacks that are robust when played over a speaker in multiple
environments. We show that such attacks are possible even while being virtually
imperceptible to listeners.
1 Introduction
While machine learning algorithms have shown impressive performance on a variety of tasks in recent
years, it has been shown that these algorithms can succumb to so-called adversarial attacks [22, 13, 8].
These adversarial attacks have been applied to a variety of tasks including image [22], speech [4, 21],
and control [11, 3] domains. In adversarial attacks, a small perturbation (often imperceptible to a
human observer) is added to the input signal with the goal of changing the output of the algorithm.
This not only raises concerns over edge cases that may lead to unexplainable failures but also the
security of systems that employ these algorithms.
With the ubiquity of personal voice assistants (Siri, Alexa, Google Home, etc.) which rely on
automatic speech recognition (ASR), it is a natural question to ask how robust these systems are
to adversarial attacks. Typical adversaries for ASR systems are generated through targeted attacks
which change the characters in the original utterance such that a target phase is transcribed. While
there are instances where a single character or word replacement may be sufficient, for the majority
of adversarial attacks on ASR systems the whole phrase needs to be attacked. Furthermore, the
adversarial attacks must be robust to perturbations so that they can be played over-the-air.
In the audio domain, the psychoacoustic properties of the human auditory system can be exploited to
generate attacks that are more potent yet less perceptible. These rely on masking effects, where certain
frequencies are less perceptible when presented simultaneously to the auditory system [15]. Another
benefit of relying on perceptual based measures is that any non-speech audio in the environment can
be utilized to inject noise into the signal, i.e., more noise allows for stronger attacks. This was utilized
in [26] where the attack was based on a music piece that contained an adversarial speech command.
In [25] over-the-air attacks were successfully implemented by incorporating typical transformations
in the adversarial generation process that an audio signal encounters from source to receiver. However,
the adversarial generation did not incorporate any psychoacoustic properties which produced audible
distortions to the signal. These psychoacoustic properties were included in [18] but relied on back-
propagation through the frequency domain and were not carried out in an over-the-air scenario.
Furthermore, most previous adversarial audio work relies on subjective human listening tests and
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metrics that do not explicitly account for the perceptual distortion of the adversarial signal, e.g., only
the SNR difference is used.
In this paper, we propose a novel formulation of a psychoacoustic based attack for adversarial
audio generation. This formulation exploits the psychoacoustic masking thresholds of the original
signal and has an explicit trade-off between the audio distortion and strength of the adversary. The
adversary can be generated completely in the time domain (once the psychoacoustic properties of the
original phrase are converted from the frequency domain). We evaluate the adversarial audio using
the Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) score, which eliminates the need for human
listening tests. Finally, we perform over-the-air tests to highlight the robustness of the adversaries.
2 Background and Related Work
Typical deep learning based ASR systems are end-to-end models which take raw speech segments
and output a transcript. Since the processing of the audio signal is a multi-step process, attacks can
target either the raw signal or the signal after it has been processed in a transform domain, e.g. after a
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) operation. To further increase the potency of the attacks they can be
applied in such a way to exploit properties of the signal in both the time and frequency domains.
In [5, 24, 1], attacks were generated by manipulating the Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC)
and inverse transforming the coefficients back to the time domain. However, due to the lossy nature
of the MFCC computation, some of the information of the original audio signal is lost, limiting the
attack space. The raw signal was attacked in [4, 25] in a complete end-to-end fashion. These attacks
focused on limiting the size of the adversary based on the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) only, and did
not account for the perceptual distortion introduced by the adversary.
In [25] these attacks were extended to incorporate typical transformations in the adversarial gener-
ation process that an audio signal encounters from source to receiver. This was shown to improve
the robustness of the attacks for over-the-air broadcasting but were more perceptible to listeners.
Psychoacoustic properties were used to reduce the perceptibility of the adversarial signal in [21, 18],
but both methods encountered instability during back-propagation in the frequency domain. These
methods were also not explored in the physical domain, i.e., they were conducted in the pure digital
domain. Due to path effects from the speaker to the receiver, as well as additive noise, the success of
the adversary may be severely affected in an over-the air scenario.
We propose a formulation for psychoacoustic based attacks that does not have the aforementioned
stability issues in the frequency domain. The formulation exploits the symmetry properties of the
Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) so that, once the relevant perceptual measures are extracted from
the original audio, the attack can be performed solely in the time domain. This reduces the memory
requirements of the attack, compared to a frequency domain formulation, as there is no need to
store both real and imaginary components. We further add robustness to the attacks for over-the-air
conditions by using generated room impulse responses.
For perceptual evaluation of the adversarial signals, we use the Perceptual Evaluation of Speech
Quality (PESQ) score [19] which has a range from 0.5 (poor) to 4.5 (excellent). The PESQ score is
an objective measure to assess the speech quality of a system that induces a distortion on a reference
speech signal in a completely automatic fashion, i.e., no listeners are necessary. It therefore helps
characterize the quality of the speech signal as it would be perceived by a listener.
The generated attacks are shown to have high perceptual scores, i.e. low audible distortion, while still
changing the transcription of the ASR system. The adversarial attacks are also shown to be robust
when played over a speaker in mono (original audio and adversary on the same channel) and stereo
(original audio and adversary on different channels) fashion.
3 Methodology
3.1 Model Architecture
We use the DeepSpeech [10] model to generate adversarial audio examples. DeepSpeech is a speech-
to-text multi-layer bi-directional model that uses the Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC)
loss [9]. A raw audio waveform x is fed to the DeepSpeech model to produce a character level
probability for each frame, which when decoded, produces an output phrase y. The CTC loss function
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is further able to score the most probable characters and phrases through different time alignments of
x. The CTC is a fully differentiable function which can therefore be exploited to allow for adversarial
generation on a per character level through each time instance over the entire length of x.
3.2 Adversarial Audio Generation
In adversarial audio attacks, a perturbation, δ, is applied to the original raw waveform x˜ = x + δ
such that the output is now changed to target phrase yt. This can be formulated as an optimization
problem over δ of the form [4]
minimize
‖δ‖2≤
L(x+ δ, ytarget) (1)
where L(·) is the loss function and where ‖ · ‖2 is an l2-norm. This minimization problem is solved
over the complete audio signal, again by exploiting the CTC loss function, ensuring that the l2-norm
of the adversary is inside some -ball.
The adversary in (1) is only constrained to be inside an -ball and is usually chosen in such a way as to
minimally perturb the input. However, even if the attack is successful using this formulation, audible
artifacts may still be perceptible. This is a result of the addition of certain frequency components,
when considering the attack from the frequency domain, where the human auditory system has a
varying sensitivity to intensity as a function of frequency. This sensitivity can be included in the
optimization in (1) and furthermore exploited, to better mask the adversary.
3.3 Psychoacoustic Model
The sensitivity of human auditory system is a function of both intensity, typically measured with
a logarithmic sound pressure level (dB SPL), and frequency. It does not have a uniform response,
requiring as little as -5 dB SPL (light leaf rustling) in the peak regime (2-5 kHz), and requires higher
intensities, especially as the bounds of human hearing are approached ([20Hz, 20kHz]).
Due to this sensitivity and the discrete way in which sound is processed by the auditory system, a
masking effect occurs around critical bands when multiple frequencies are presented simultaneously
to a listener. The critical bands can be thought of as drowning out other frequencies in the neighbor-
hood, which is again both a function of frequency and intensity, i.e., low intensities produce smaller
masking effects [15]. This masking can therefore be exploited to embed the adversarial signal under
a certain hearing threshold thereby ensuring that it remains imperceptible.
Speech can be thought of as a dynamically changing process throughout the temporal domain. In
order to get an accurate representation of the frequency components, analysis is normally carried
out on short segments, or frames. Frame lengths are typically on the order of 10-20ms for speech
processing [p. 41][23], where it is assumed that the frequency components are stationary within
this time frame. There is a small amount of overlap between frames, to ensure frequency continuity,
and a window functioning is applied to smooth the transition of frequency components. Using this
approach, the raw waveform x is segmented into N frames of length L given as
xn(kT ) = x(kT + nL)wL(t− nL) k ∈ [0, N − 1] (2)
where n is the frame index and wL is a window function.
The psychoacoustic model used to find the global masking threshold is based on the MPEG-ISO
[12] and was included in the attack presented in [21]. We will not explain in detail how the global
masking threshold is generated and we refer the reader to [16, 7, 4] for a more in depth explanation.
Calculating the global masking threshold per frame consists of the following 5 steps:
1. The frame is first normalized to a standard dB SPL which converts each frame to roughly
the same intensity levels. While this is only an approximation of the dB SPL it is needed as
signals have intensity levels that are functions of room dynamics, microphone responses
and so forth. The signal is then windowed and transformed to the FFT domain to generate a
power spectral density (PSD).
2. Tonal and non-tonal maskers are then identified in the PSD. The tonal maskers represent
exact frequency peaks in the PSD while the non-tonal maskers are found by a geometric
mean across a group of frequencies. These maskers then help identify which frequencies
become less perceptible when presented simultaneously.
3
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
0
20
40
Frequency (Hz)
dB
SP
L
Absolute Threshold of Hearing
Global Masking Threshold
Frame PSD
(Non)-Tonal Maskers
Figure 1: The absolute threshold of hearing compared to the global masking threshold extracted from
a speech frame.
3. The number of maskers is then reduced, or decimated, by comparing the tonal and non-tonal
maskers using a sliding window scheme. This reduces the granularity of the maskers and
results in a smoother transition between peaks in the PSD.
4. The tonal and non-tonal maskers are then used to generate a masking pattern that encom-
passes the adjacent frequencies.
5. The global masking threshold is the then found by combining the masking patterns from the
previous step. This global masking threshold then represents a perceptual weighting that is
based on the intensity and frequency components of the signal as well as the psychoacoustic
properties of the human auditory system.
The resulting global masking threshold t can then be found for each frame N across all frequencies
f , tn(f) ∈ [0, fs2 ], where fs is the sampling frequency.
Figure 1 shows the absolute threshold of hearing (the minimal dB SPL for a sound to be perceived),
the tonal and non-tonal maskers and the global masking threshold for a single analysis frame. The
fill between the lines represents parts of the frequency band that will not be perceptible unless a
higher dB SPL is reached, e.g., around 3 kHz there is a 10 dB SPL gap between the global masking
threshold and the PSD of the analysis frame. The adversarial signal can therefore be added to this
portion of the frequency spectrum, up to the masking threshold, while remaining inaudible.
3.4 Perceptual Based Audio Attack Optimization
Since the psychoacoustic model exploits the frequency domain relationship between the signal and
the human auditory system, it is natural to first analyze how the attack can be formalized in the
frequency domain. Relying on the linearity property of the Fourier transform, the adversary at frame
n and frequency f can be represented as
X˜n(f) = Xn(f) + δn(f) . (3)
The perceptual loss can be formulated as a weighting in the frequency domain [p.60][14] between the
original waveform and the adversarial waveform represented as
Lpercep(δ) =
1
2N
N−1∑
n=0
fs
2∑
f=0
wn(f)|δn(f)|2 (4)
where wn(f) is a perceptual based weighting factor. This weighting factor is based on the global
masking threshold derived in Section 3.3 as
wn(f) = 10
−βtn(f) (5)
where β is a compression factor that defines how much of the perceptual based weighting should be
included and has been heuristically determined to lie in the range [0.04-0.06] [7]. This can be thought
of similarly to a power weighting between the original signal and the adversary.
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The frequency based perceptual loss in (4) can now be reformulated in the time domain as:
Lpercep(δ) =
1
2N
N−1∑
n=0
δTnD
HWnDδn ≡ 1
2N
N−1∑
n=0
δTnGnδn (6)
where (·)H represent the conjugate transpose of a matrix,D is the DFT matrix, andWn is a symmetric
weighting matrix around fs2 defined as:
Wn =

wn(0) 0 . . . 0
0 wn(1) . . . 0
...
...
...
...
0 . . . wn(1) 0
0 . . . 0 wn(0)
 . (7)
For the ease of exposition we represent the multiplication of the weighting matrix and the DFT
matrices as Gn = DHWnD. Note that because of the symmetry properties of the DFT, the imaginary
components are cancelled during the multiplication such that Gn ∈ RL×L, where L is the DFT
window length which is assumed to be equal to the frame length in (2).
We can now combine the perceptual based loss in (6) and the adversarial loss in (1) as
minimize
‖δ‖2≤
(
αL(x+ δ, ytarget) + (1− α)Lpercep(δ)
) ≡ minimize
‖δ‖2≤
Ltot(x+ δ, ytarget, α) (8)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and Ltot represents the total loss. While  constrains the overall size of the
perturbation, α controls the amount of perceptual based penalty included in the optimization.
One of the benefits of using equation (8) is that the G matrices need only be computed once before
optimizing the adversary as the original audio is not changed, i.e., the global masking threshold
remains constant throughout the optimization procedure. This means that the adversarial signal does
not need to be transformed to the frequency domain at each iteration. Compared to previous attacks
that take place in the frequency domain, this approach reduces the memory needed, as real and
complex components are no longer stored, and alleviates the previously mentioned stability problems
in the optimization.
We use the l2 norm constraint on δ in (8) which allows for the attacks to be more localized in the
audio signals. This is contrast to other adversarial audio attacks which use an l∞ allowing for equally
large perturbations across the whole audio signal. Since the adversary is now constrained based
on the l2-norm, it typically has larger values than that of an l∞ attack. To solve (8) we rely of the
projected gradient descent (PGD) method
δ := P
(
δ − µ ∇δLtot(x+ δ, yt, α)‖∇δLtot(x+ δ, yt, α)‖
)
(9)
where P is the projection on the  ball and µ is the step size. The projection of (9) is then given as
Pz = 
z
max{, ‖z‖2} . (10)
Before the projection, we also include the constraint −1 ≤ x+ δ ≤ 1 to ensure that the adversarial
signal lies within the valid normalized audio signal range. The normalization of the gradient in (9)
also helps stabilize the descent direction.
4 Experimental results
The DeepSpeech model was trained in pyTorch using the Librispeech dataset [17] which consists of
960 hours of clean audio with corresponding transcriptions. During training, a sampling frequency of
fs = 16 kHz was used and the data was augmented by adding random noise as well as pitch and time
shifting the signal. The compression factor in (5) was β = 0.06 for all experiments. The probabilities
from the DeepSpeech model were decoded using a greedy method, i.e. at each instance, only the
character with the highest probability is selected.
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Table 1: Comparison of Perceptual and non-Perceptual Based Attacks on the LibiriSpeech Test Set
Perceptual Weighting (α) SNR (dB) PESQ WER CER
0 27.9 3.3 0 0
0.8 24.1 4.0 0 0
0.30.40.50.60.70.80.91
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
α
PE
SQ
Figure 2: PESQ score with varying α in (8).
In order to assess the performance of the attack, we used several metrics that analyzed both the signal
characteristics and final transcription. The word error rate (WER) is derived from the Levenshtein
Distance algorithm and defines the minimum edit between two strings given as:
WER =
S +D + I
N
(11)
where S is the number of substitutions, D is the number of deletions, I is the number of insertions,
and N = S + D + C where C is the number of correct words. For a perfect attack y = yt,
S = D = I = 0 producing a WER=0. As the distance between the two string increases y 6= yt,
i.e. more characters and words are changed, the WER likewise increases. The character error rate
(CER) is the per-character difference between two strings and CER=0 when y = yt. For perceptual
evaluation we used the Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) score [19] which has a range
from 0.5 (poor) to 4.5 (excellent). The PESQ score was calculated in full reference mode, which is a
sample-by-sample distortion comparison between x and x˜ after a temporal alignment. The output
SNR was estimated using the original signal and δ as the noise signal.
Generated adversaries using the phrase "open the door" as yt with an  = 1000 had a 100% success
rate (WER = CER = 0) on 100 randomly sampled audio files from the Librispeech test set when
no perceptual weighting was used (α = 1). The same randomly sampled files were attacked again,
this time with α = 0.8 allowing for perceptual weighing to be included in the loss function. The
perceptually weighted files again had a 100% success rate (WER = CER = 0).
The SNR and PESQ scores were calculated for each signal using the perceptual (α = 0.8) and
non-perceptual based (α = 1) attacks. In Table 1, we see that there is drop in the SNR and rise in
PESQ score when using a perceptual based attack compared to that of a non-perceptual based attack.
This reason for this can be intuitively thought of as follows: When no perceptual weighting is used,
the attack can equally spread anywhere on the frequency spectrum. This spreading in the frequency
domain reduces the overall amplitude for any one frequency component which corresponds to a lower
adversarial signal power and hence higher SNR. However, when the perceptual loss is included, the
attack is focused more around frequencies that dominate the global masking threshold. This has the
effect of increasing the power on some of the components, lowering the SNR, but ensuring that these
lie within the masking threshold and are inaudible, raising the PESQ score.
Figure 2 shows the PESQ score as α is decreased which was stopped when the CER 6= 0 at α = 0.3.
Surprisingly, the PESQ score rises rapidly with only a small decrease in α, indicating a rapid rise
in the perceptual quality. With an α = 0.4, the PESQ score is almost at a maximal value of 4.5, so
to a listener it would sound as if x = x˜. It was observed that the attack was not always successful
with very low values of α. This is most likely due to the adversary being heavily penalized for lying
outside of the global masking threshold. This limits the overall bandwidth the attack can use and may
prevent it from changing enough of the signal to generate a successful attack.
The effect of α can also be observed in the change of the spectrogram in Figure 3. Figure 3b shows
the spectrogram when α = 1 so there is no constraint on where the adversary can attack. We see that
6
08000
H
z
(a) Original spectrogram
0
8000
H
z
(b) Spectrogram with α = 1 in (7)
0
8000
H
z
(c) Spectrogram with α = 0.5 in (7)
Figure 3: Spectrogram of the original raw audio, α = 1 and α = 0.5.
the adversary is spread almost evenly around all frequency bands. In Figure 3c , when α = 0.5, we
see that the majority of the attack lies in these higher frequencies, especially when there is no speech
present in the original signal which comes directly from the absolute threshold of hearing as shown
in Figure 1.
4.1 Over-the-Air Attacks
We further extended the testing to outside of the pure digital domain and perform over-the-air attacks
(speaker/microphone combination). In order to improve the robustness of signals for over-the-air
attacks, we first pass them through a room simulator [20] much like the Expectation over Transform
method [2, 18, 25]. Note that instead of using prerecording room impulse responses as in [25], we
take a more robust approach as in [18], where a room simulator is used to generate responses with
varying size and reflection coefficients for surfaces. A bandpass filter was also applied in the range
f = [100, 7500] to eliminate any spurious low frequency components and account for the frequency
drop-off that occurs near the Nyquist rate in digital recording hardware.
An Extech HD 6000 sound level meter was used to measure the loudness, using A-weighted decibels
(dBA) which accounts for the sensitivity of human hearing, from the speaker to the microphone. The
over-the-air tests were performed in an anechoic chamber with a noise floor of 36 dBA. The signals
were broadcast using a Polk S20 speaker, Yamaha p2500s amplifier, and recorded using a MINI DSP
UMIK-1 microphone.
The microphone was first positioned close to the speaker to ensure a high SNR and eliminate any path
effects between the microphone and speaker. The distance between the microphone and speaker was
then gradually increased, resulting in a lower SNR, to observe the effects of both added path effects
and reduced signal power. A language model decoder, based on the Librispeech 4-gram ARPA, was
also added to the end of the DeepSpeech model in parallel to the greedy decoder. The language
model has the ability to error correct characters and words based on the speech corpus and, in some
instances, can decrease the WER and CER rate.
Figure 4 shows the WER and CER for the over-the-air attack using both a greedy and language model
decoder. At a high SNR, the signal experiences clipping (the maximum amplitude of the signal is
larger that the microphone response), which results in a high WER and CER (large string distance
between y and yt). Since the adversary is given as x+ δ, we see that when clipping occurs on the
positive rail, max{1, x+ δ}, this will result in a truncation of the adversary and, in the extreme case,
truncation of the original signal. The same will hold for the negative rail as well. As the distance
increases and the SNR lowers, moving the x + δ away from the rails, the signal exhibits a lower
WER and CER for both the language model (LM) and greedy decoder (G). Between 60 and 70 dBA,
the language model decoder had a WER=4.0 and CER=2.4 while the greedy decoder had a WER=3.0
and CER=2.25.
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Figure 4: Word and character error rates for varying SNRs (3 tests at each level) using a language
model (LM) and greedy (G) decoder.
Table 2: Average error rates for two speaker over-the-air attack
WER CER
Language Model Decoder 0.5 0.5
Greedy Decoder 5 4
We further extended the over-the-air scenario to a two speaker setup which broadcasts the original
audio and the adversary on two separate channels. The speakers were separated by a distance of 4
inches and the microphone was placed 6 inches from the speakers which resulted in a 40o separation
between the speakers as observed from the microphone. The signal was measured with an average of
66.7 dBA at the microphone during broadcasting. Table 2 shows the average error rates over 4 trials
for a language model and greedy decoder. The attack performs especially well using the language
model decoder for the two speaker system, achieving a WER=0 and CER=0 for 3 of out the 4 trials.
5 Conclusion
This work has demonstrated a method for generating white-box adversarial examples with psychoa-
coustic based constraints. The adversaries were generated in an end-to-end fashion which relied
on extracting relevant psychoacoustic information from the original audio signal. The optimization
problem relied on an l2-norm constraint in conjunction with the projected gradient descent method.
The perceptual quality was based on the PESQ score, which eliminated the need for exhaustive
listening tests. It was shown the adversarial examples typically lowered the SNR but, because of the
psychoacoustic based constraints, the perceptual quality of the signal was increased resulting in a
higher PESQ score. Finally, the attacks were shown to be effective in over-the-air broadcasting.
In future work, transferability between architectures, similar to [6], will be explored to understand
the generalizability of the attacks. While the current attacks are all performed in a white-box fashion
(access to the entire model), black-box attacks will be explored to mimic more realistic scenarios.
Most ASR systems found in homes rely on microphone arrays and perform pre-processing steps
such as, beamforming, noise reduction, etc. The current attack does not account for these steps
which will most likely severely impact the strength of the adversary. The attacks also currently take
several minutes to construct which is infeasible for real-time systems. Future attacks will have to be
computationally efficient while still retaining their robustness.
8
References
[1] Moustafa Alzantot, Bharathan Balaji, and Mani B. Srivastava. Did you hear that? adversarial
examples against automatic speech recognition. CoRR, abs/1801.00554, 2018.
[2] Anish Athalye, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, and Kevin Kwok. Synthesizing robust adver-
sarial examples. In Proceedings of the 35th International Conference on Machine Learning,
ICML, pages 284–293, 2018.
[3] Vahid Behzadan and Arslan Munir. Vulnerability of deep reinforcement learning to policy
induction attacks. In Machine Learning and Data Mining in Pattern Recognition, pages 262–275,
Cham, 2017. Springer International Publishing.
[4] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Audio adversarial examples: Targeted attacks on speech-to-text. In
2018 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), pages 1–7, May 2018.
[5] Nicholas Carlini, Pratyush Mishra, Tavish Vaidya, Yuankai Zhang, Micah Sherr, Clay Shields,
David Wagner, and Wenchao Zhou. Hidden voice commands. In 25th USENIX Security
Symposium, pages 513–530, 2016.
[6] Moustapha M Cisse, Yossi Adi, Natalia Neverova, and Joseph Keshet. Houdini: Fooling deep
structured visual and speech recognition models with adversarial examples. In Advances in
neural information processing systems, pages 6977–6987, 2017.
[7] B. Defraene, T. van Waterschoot, H. J. Ferreau, M. Diehl, and M. Moonen. Real-time perception-
based clipping of audio signals using convex optimization. IEEE Transactions on Audio, Speech,
and Language Processing, 20(10):2657–2671, Dec 2012.
[8] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adver-
sarial examples. CoRR, abs/1412.6572, 2015.
[9] Alex Graves, Santiago Fernandez, Faustino Gomez, and Jurgen Schmidhuber. Connectionist
temporal classification: Labelling unsegmented sequence data with recurrent neural networks. In
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML, pages 369–376,
2006.
[10] Awni Y. Hannun, Carl Case, Jared Casper, Bryan Catanzaro, Greg Diamos, Erich Elsen, Ryan
Prenger, Sanjeev Satheesh, Shubho Sengupta, Adam Coates, and Andrew Y. Ng. Deep speech:
Scaling up end-to-end speech recognition. CoRR, abs/1412.5567, 2014.
[11] Sandy Huang, Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, Yan Duan, and Pieter Abbeel. Adversarial
attacks on neural network policies. arXiv, 2017.
[12] Information technology – Coding of moving pictures and associated audio for digital storage
media at up to about 1,5 Mbit/s – Part 3: Audio. Standard, International Organization for
Standardization, Geneva, CH, 1993.
[13] Alexey Kurakin, Ian J. Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Adversarial examples in the physical
world. CoRR, abs/1607.02533, 2017.
[14] Alan V. Oppenheim, Ronald W. Schafer, and John R. Buck. Discrete-time Signal Processing
(2nd Ed.). Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 1999.
[15] Andrew J Oxenham. Mechanisms and mechanics of auditory masking. Journal of Physiology,
591(10):2375, 5 2013.
[16] T. Painter and A. Spanias. Perceptual coding of digital audio. Proceedings of the IEEE,
88(4):451–515, April 2000.
[17] V. Panayotov, G. Chen, D. Povey, and S. Khudanpur. Librispeech: An ASR corpus based on
public domain audio books. In 2015 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and
Signal Processing (ICASSP), pages 5206–5210, April 2015.
[18] Yao Qin, Nicholas Carlini, Ian Goodfellow, Garrison Cottrell, and Colin Raffel. Imperceptible,
Robust, and Targeted Adversarial Examples for Automatic Speech Recognition. arXiv e-prints,
page arXiv:1903.10346, Mar 2019.
[19] A. W. Rix, J. G. Beerends, M. P. Hollier, and A. P. Hekstra. Perceptual evaluation of speech
quality (PESQ)-a new method for speech quality assessment of telephone networks and codecs.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Int. Conf. on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP,
pages 749–752, 2001.
9
[20] R. Scheibler, E. Bezzam, and I. Dokmanic´. Pyroomacoustics: A python package for audio room
simulation and array processing algorithms. pages 351–355, April 2018.
[21] Lea Schönherr, Katharina Kohls, Steffen Zeiler, Thorsten Holz, and Dorothea Kolossa. Ad-
versarial attacks against automatic speech recognition systems via psychoacoustic hiding. In
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2019.
[22] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Good-
fellow, and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. In International Conference
on Learning Representations, 2014.
[23] Ivan Jelev Tashev. Sound Capture and Processing: Practical Approaches. Wiley Publishing,
2009.
[24] Tavish Vaidya, Yuankai Zhang, Micah Sherr, and Clay Shields. Cocaine noodles: exploiting the
gap between human and machine speech recognition. In 9th USENIX Workshop on Offensive
Technologies (WOOT 15), 2015.
[25] Hiromu Yakura and Jun Sakuma. Robust audio adversarial example for a physical attack. CoRR,
abs/1810.11793, 2018.
[26] Xuejing Yuan, Yuxuan Chen, Yue Zhao, Yunhui Long, Xiaokang Liu, Kai Chen, Shengzhi
Zhang, Heqing Huang, XiaoFeng Wang, and Carl A. Gunter. Commandersong: A systematic
approach for practical adversarial voice recognition. In 27th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 18), pages 49–64, 2018.
10
